In Justice v. Gwendolyn Vercher, Case No. 18CV17601 (Oregon Judicial Department, Washington County Circuit Court, Twentieth Judicial District, Sept. 17, 2018) the Court dismissed a complaint filed by the Animal Legal Defense Fund, for Justice, the Plaintiff, a quarter horse. The Court held that an animal, including the equine Plaintiff, lacked the legal capacity to
Connecticut Court Dismisses Nonhuman Rights Projects’ Latest Attempt To Obtain Personhood Rights For Animals.
As they had promised, the Nonhuman Rights Projects, Inc. (the “petitioner”) filed another petition seeking personhood rights through a writ of habeas corpus for 3 elephants in Connecticut owned by R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. (the “Commerford Zoo”) on November 13, 2017.
Long before the scheduled status conference, which was to be held on
Words Matter-Chimpanzees are not “Clients”
You have probably heard of the decision by the First Judicial Department’s Appellate’s Division upholding the lower courts’ decision not to sign orders to show cause seeking the transfer of chimpanzees from one form of captivity to another, under the rejected narrative that writs of habeas corpus should be applied to the chimps because
Richard L. Cupp: Gorilla’s death calls for human responsibility, not animal personhood
Richard L. Cupp, Pepperdine University, writes for The Conversation:
My reaction to the killing of Harambe the gorilla at the Cincinnati zoo when a child went into the gorilla’s enclosure is probably typical: I am sickened and I am angry. This must not happen again.
One step that some advocates will surely
Reading List: “Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood” by Pepperdine Law School Professor Richard Cupp
Pepperdine Law School Professor Richard Cupp has posted on SSRN.com an article that is forthcoming in the Florida Law Review entitled Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood.
The article may be downloaded for free at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775288.
This Article analyzes whether courts should grant legal personhood to intelligent animal species, such as chimpanzees,