Bill A-4840 in the New Jersey Assembly, as currently drafted would interfere with the veterinarian-client-patient relationship and a pet owners ability to determine the proper care for their pets, and would provide animals greater access to free legal representation than people accused of criminal animal cruelty misdemeanors in the State.  It should not be passed unless amended.

The bill, as proposed states,

In any criminal court proceeding pursuant to R.S.4:22-17 et seq. or pursuant to P.L.2015, c.85 (C.2C:33-31), or any other criminal proceeding that affects the welfare or care of a cat or dog, the court may order, upon its own initiative or upon request of a party or counsel for a party, that a separate advocate be appointed to represent the best interests of the animal.  If a court orders an advocate to be appointed, the advocate shall be appointed from a list provided to the court by the Administrative Director of the Courts.  A decision by the court denying a request to appoint a separate advocate to represent the best interests of the animal shall not be subject to appeal.  A-4840 (emphasis added).

The “separate advocate . . . appointed to represent the best interests of the animal” would be in a similar legal position as a guardian ad litem appointed by the court, upon request, to represent the best interests of a child or incapacitated adult.

As the American Veterinary Medical Association’s position on guardianship of animals states, such changes in terminology and its effect would not protect animals, but would instead be harmful.

The American Veterinary Medical Association promotes the optimal health and welfare of animals.  Further, the AVMA recognizes the role of responsible owners in providing for their animals’ care.  Any change in terminology describing the relationship between animals and owners, including ‘guardian,’ does not strengthen this relationship and may, in fact, harm it.  Such changes in terminology may adversely affect the ability of society to obtain and deliver animal services and, ultimately, result in animal suffering.

When a similar bill was introduced in the Connecticut legislature, the Connecticut Veterinary Medical Association opposed the bill on similar grounds.  Before it was passed, it was amended to permit an animal advocate to represent the interest of justice, not the animal in certain criminal proceedings.

Animal cruelty is never acceptable, but the rights of animals to legal representation in court should not exceed the rights afforded to those accused of such acts.  If animals are to receive the benefit of legal representation, so too should the accused.  Since many animal cruelty offenses are considered non-indictable offenses, a defendant would not have access to a public defender, and would instead have to pay for legal representations.  If animals in these cases would be represented by attorneys appointed by the State or worse, from animal rights organizations, a gross misapplication of justice would result.

Even more concerning, is the escalation of the rights of animals as similar to the rights of children or incapacitated adults requiring representation by guardians ad litem.  The escalation of animal rights to those provided to humans, should be a concern to all except those who believe animals and humans should be afforded the same legal rights and that animal ownership is unconscionable and unethical.

Therefore, the bill should be amended to include representation of the accused in the same manner that the interests of the animals would be represented and should limit appointment of an advocate only by the court, and not upon the request of a party or counsel for a party.

NOTE: The Senate companion bill is S-3322.  A-4840 is scheduled for the Assembly Judiciary Committee on January 24.

In Justice v. Gwendolyn Vercher, Case No. 18CV17601 (Oregon Judicial Department, Washington County Circuit Court, Twentieth Judicial District, Sept. 17, 2018) the Court dismissed a complaint filed by the Animal Legal Defense Fund, for Justice, the Plaintiff, a quarter horse.  The Court held that an animal, including the equine Plaintiff, lacked the legal capacity to sue, pursuant to Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure (ORCP) §21(A)(4) and for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim, pursuant to ORCP 21(A)(8).

The court finds that a non-human animal such as Justice lacks the legal status or qualifications

necessary for the assertion of legal rights and duties in a court of law . . . Justice is not the real party in interest. There are profound implications of a judicial finding that a horse, or any non-human animal for that matter, is a legal entity that has the legal right to assert a claim in a court of law. Such a finding would likely lead to a flood of lawsuits whereby non-human animals could assert claims we now reserve just for humans and human creations such as business and other entities. Furthermore, non-human animals are incapable of accepting legal responsibilities.

The Court observed that an appellate court or the state legislature might determine that public policy regarding this issue should permit such legal actions from animals, perhaps opening the door for further uncertainty through an appeal or legislative action.

The Court declined to award attorneys’ fees and costs to the defendant that was dragged into this seemingly frivolous lawsuit.

This is not the first time—or likely the last—activist nonprofit organizations have filed lawsuits on behalf of animals, in attempts to elevate their status to those of humans.  The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NHRP) filed a number of failed attempts to apportion personhood rights to certain animals, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy v. Lavery, 100 N.E.3d 846 (N.Y. 2018); The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392, 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), leave to appeal denied sub nom. The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy v. Lavery, 100 N.E.3d 846 (N.Y. 2018); The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 3 N.Y.S.3d 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 2015); Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (N.Y.  Sup. Ct. 2015); The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, 2015 WL 1812988 (N.Y. Sup.); see also, Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004); Naruto v. Slater, 2018 WL 1902414 (9th Cir. April 23, 2018); Tilikum v Sea World Parks & Entertainment, 84 2 F.Supp.2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012).

NHRP filed another petition, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., No. 17-5009822, slip op. (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2017), seeking personhood rights through a writ of habeas corpus for three elephants in Connecticut owned by R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. (the “Commerford Zoo”) on November 13, 2017.  Long before the scheduled status conference, which was to be held on February 27, 2018, the Court filed a Judgment of Dismissal and related Memorandum of Decision on December 26, 2017, finding that the petitioner lacked standing under the “next friend” theory.  Id.

The burden is on the next friend clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court . . . [and holding that] [b]ecause the petition has failed to allege that it possesses any relationship with the elephants, the petitioner lacks standing.

The Court also found the petition “wholly frivolous on its face in legal terms,” stating:

even if the petitioner here had standing, resolution in its favor would require this court to determine that the asserted liberty interests in its petition are assured by statute, constitution, or common law, i.e., that an elephant is a person for the purposes of this land’s laws that protect the livery and equality interests of its persons . . . [and] [b]ased on the law as it stands today, this court cannot so find.

Recently, the NHRP filed another writ of habeas corpus in Orleans County, New York, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on behalf of Happy v. Breheny, No. 18-45164 (N.Y. 2018) “demanding recognition of [an elephant named] Happy’s legal personhood and fundamental right to bodily liberty as well as her transfer to an elephant sanctuary.”  Happy has been housed at the Bronx Zoo since around 1977.  In the Memorandum of Law filed in support of its application, NHRP did not cite to the decision in R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc.

Circuit Judge Smith’s concurring opinion in Naruto v. Slater, 2018 WL 1902414 (9th Cir. April 23, 2018) also discusses restrictions on “next friend” or “third party” standing, stating:

The limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition that ‘it was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves as next friends’ . . . Indeed, if there were no restrictions on ‘next friend’ standing in federal courts, the litigant asserting only a generalized interest in constitutional governance could circumvent the jurisdictional limits of Art. III simply by assuming the mantle of ‘next friend.’

More to come on these latest legal proceedings and other continued attempts to change the legal status of nonhuman animals.

Edgy Animal Welfare

16 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2018

Richard L. Cupp

Pepperdine University School of Law

Date Written: July 18, 2018

Abstract

Legal animal welfare proponents should not reject out-of-hand reforms that may be celebrated by some as steps toward a radical version of animal rights. Rather, animal welfare proponents should consider the costs, risks, and benefits of all potential reforms. Some potential reforms’ risks and costs outweigh their benefits. But, both to improve animals’ welfare and to avoid irrelevance in an evolving society, legal animal welfare advocates should be willing to tolerate some costs and risks. Walking on the edge of slippery slopes is in some situations better than avoiding the slopes altogether. Connecticut’s 2016 animal advocacy statute provides an illustration of legal reform that legal animal welfare proponents should embrace even though it presents some risks of being perceived as a step toward a radical legal personhood rights paradigm.

Cupp, Richard L., Edgy Animal Welfare (July 18, 2018). Denver Law Review (Forthcoming); Pepperdine University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018/11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216112

NOTE:  Law review articles available for free download at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=543387

 

In Naruto v. Slater, 2018 WL 1902414 (9th Cir. April 23, 2018)-the case in which Naruto, a crested macaque by and through his alleged “next friends,” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, sued a photographer and his publishers for copyright infringement-the Court, citing an earlier case, Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004) stated that at least part of the requirements for standing-the existence of a case or controversy-was not impossible simply because the plaintiffs were animals.

While in both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not have standing under the relevant statutes-in-suit, the fact that animals may have standing has been disputed by some and seems inconsistent with this court’s reasoning.

In Cetacean Cmty. the Court stated “we see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from authorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it prevents suits brought in the name of artificial persons such as corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or of juridically incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles, and mental incompetents.”  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176.

But what the courts seem to overlook is that Article III is one of several articles to the Constitution of the United States which begins:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.  (Emphasis added).

I find Circuit Judge Smith’s concurring opinion in Naruto v. Slater, explaining the restrictions on “next friend” or “third party” standing, instructive.

The limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition that ‘it was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves as next friends.’

NOTE-isn’t this essentially what the Nonhuman rights project has done in its various, non-winning petitions for writs of habeas corpus.

And Judge Smith added:

Indeed, if there were no restrictions on ‘next friend’ standing in federal courts, the litigant asserting only a generalized interest in constitutional governance could circumvent the jurisdictional limits of Art. III simply by assuming the mantle of ‘next friend.’

Judge Smith disagreed with the majority finding that lack of next friend standing removes jurisdiction of the court, while the majority held that next-friend standing is nonjurisdictional.

Both Judge Smith and the majority agreed that “animals cannot be represented by a next friend.”

And Judge Smith explains that “[t]here is no textual support in either the habeas corpus statute or Rule 17 for animal next friends,” providing additional legal support for courts’ rejections of the Nonhuman Rights Projects’ petitions that claimed that animals were legal persons.

However, because of these holdings over standing via Article III’s case and controversy provision by the 9th Circuit we expect to see more cases brought under the guise of the next friend.

Of note, in Oregon, a lawsuit was filed by a horse (Justice) “by and through his Guardian, Kim Mosiman” against his former owner, who had already pleaded guilty to neglect of the horse.  The suit includes a single claim for relief of negligence, allegedly based on Justice’s owner’s requirement to comply with Oregon’s anti-cruelty statute, which the owner had previously pleaded guilty to.  Justice requests relief for economic damages of not less than $100,000, non-economic damages in an amount to be determined at trial, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and disbursements, and other relief the court deems proper.

We should expect similar lawsuits to be filed in many jurisdictions.

 

 

As they had promised, the Nonhuman Rights Projects, Inc. (the “petitioner”) filed another petition seeking personhood rights through a writ of habeas corpus for 3 elephants in Connecticut owned by R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. (the “Commerford Zoo”) on November 13, 2017.

Long before the scheduled status conference, which was to be held on February 27, 2018, the Court filed a Judgment of Dismissal and related Memorandum of Decision on December 26, 2017.

Relying on expert testimony, by way of Affidavits, petitioner alleged that elephants, including the subjects of its petition “are autonomous beings who live extraordinarily complex emotional, social, and intellectual lives and who possess those complex cognitive abilities sufficient for common law personhood and the common law right to bodily liberty protected by the common law of habeas corpus, as a matter of common law liberty, equality, or both.”  Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., No. LLI-cv-17-5009822, slip op. (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2017).

The court described the issue at hand which it summarily dismissed:

The issue is whether the court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus because the elephants are ‘persons” entitled to liberty and equality for the purposes of habeas corpus.  The court denies the petition on the ground that the court lack subject matter jurisdiction [based on lack of standing] and the petition is wholly frivolous on its face in legal terms.”  Id.

On the issue of standing, under the “next friend” theory, the court opined”

The burden is on the next friend clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court . . . [holding] [b]ecause the petition has failed to allege that it possesses any relationship with the elephants, the petitioner lacks standing.”  Id. (emphasis in original).

On its website, the petitioner states :

we are studying the decision and will likely either seek to amend our habeas corpus petition to add a sentence stating that Minnie, Karen, and Beulah have no significant relationships with anyone able to to file a habeas corpus action against their captors or we will refile our lawsuit so that our petition includes this sentence.

Under the “frivolous” prong, the Court found:

even if the petitioner here had standing, resolution in its favor would require this court to determine that the asserted liberty interests in its petition are assured by statute, constitution, or common law, i.e., that an elephant is a person for the purposes of this land’s laws that protect the livery and equality interests of its persons . . . [and] [b]ased on the law as it stands today, this court cannot so find [that there is a possibility or probability that the Court would find that an elephant is a legal person entitled to those same liberties extended to humans].

The Court “points the petitioner to this state’ laws prohibiting cruelty to animals” but that is not petitioners’ goal-it is instead to “help build a national and global movement to win legal personhood and rights for nonhuman animals.”  See NHRP, Inc.

In civil litigation, when a court finds one party has filed a frivolous lawsuit against another, at least in federal court, the victimized party may request sanctions, in certain circumstances.  See, generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  Should petitioner, now that it has been on notice that at least this Court has determined that its petition is “frivolous” be required to pay for the cost of subsequent litigation or will citizens be required to fund such cases in the future?

 

Reports from two animal-related trade organizations provide insight into the current status and goals of animal rights organizations intent on eliminating the use of animals by humans, without regard to how humanely those animals are treated.

Based on these revealing comments from activists it remains vitally important that the public is exposed to the differences between animal rights activists and animal-related industries whose goals are to ensure that animals under the care of humans are treated humanely.

Members of the National Association for Biomedical Research and the Animal Agricultural Alliance attended the 2017 Animal Rights National Conference held on August 3-6 in Alexandria Virginia.

As advertised on the website

The Animal Rights National Conferences have been organized since 1981 by Farm Animal Rights Movement (FARM) with some breaks between 1987 and 2000, then every year since 2000. They are typically co-sponsored by more than a dozen national organizations.

Farm Animal Rights Movement (FARM) is a national non-profit organization working to end the use of animals for food through public education and grassroots activism. We believe in the inherent self-worth of animals, as well as environmental protection and enhanced public health.

Speakers at the conference talked about the “Power of confrontation in advancing animal rights,” and alleged abuses of animals used for all human purposes including: animals in Entertainment (circuses, rodeos, zoos, aquariums), animals in science (education, product testing, drug research),animals in Fashion, Companion animals, food Animals, and animals in the wild.

Kay Johnson Smith, Animal Agriculture Alliance president and CEO described this year’s conference:

The speakers at this year’s Animal Rights National Conference made their goals clear – ending all forms of animal agriculture, regardless of how well animals are cared for . . . Their persistent focus on pressure campaigns targeting restaurant, retail and foodservice brands is of great concern to the Alliance and our members. We encourage anyone with a vested interest in producing, processing or selling meat, poultry, eggs and dairy, to read this year’s report and hear how determined these groups are to eliminate food choices and make our society vegan.

The alliance reported that speaker encouraged attendees to protest and conduct rescues from farms without permission, and that “[b]reaking the law can often be a good thing to do.”

The Alliance also reported that one speaker, David Coman-Hidy with the Humane League encouraged attendees to damage the reputation of food companies.

Consistent with previous years, another key message from conference speakers was for attendees to focus efforts on eliminating farms of all types and sizes, not only the large-scale, modern operations (declared to be “factory farms”) that have historically been targeted.

National Association for Biomedical Research reported about the following speakers and their comments at the conference, intent on eliminating the use of animals in research:

  • Justin Goodman, lobbyist for the White Coat Waste project (WCW), an animal rights group that promotes itself as a fiscally conservative consumer watchdog group, spoke about WCW’s “defund” campaign to “take money away so [research institutions] can’t buy the animals to do the testing.” He continued to focus on making sure universities and other institutions that conduct animal research “don’t get their money.” 

  • Michael Budkie explained [Stop Animal Exploitation Now] SAEN seeks to end animal research by “hanging them with their own paperwork.” We understand this to mean the group attacks the reputations of research institutions and individual scientists by deliberately misusing or mischaracterizing written statements provided by the institutions to government agencies like the NIH and the USDA.

  • Speaking again on behalf of SAEN, Michael Budkie explained his approach to stopping animal research by targeting researchers: “We like to paint them as idiots. They are criminals. SAEN’s job is to let people know animal research is meritless. We will ruin their reputation and credibility. We are coming after them…It becomes news and we’re changing public opinion of what labs do.”

  • A celebrated figure in the animal rights world, Richard Couto conducts undercover investigations of factory farms and food enterprises that use animals. He gains access by working as an employee while filming and documenting abuse for later use in criminal prosecutions of his erstwhile employers. Joined by other so-called “undercover investigators,” they encouraged attendees to join their ranks by stating, “anybody in this room has what it takes to be an undercover investigator.”

Clearly, the goals of animal rights organizations, on display at this conference, should concern those who are involved in animal-related industries where animals are owned and cared for by humans.

Pepperdine Law School Professor Richard Cupp has posted on SSRN.com an article that is forthcoming in the Florida Law Review entitled Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood.

The article may be downloaded for free at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775288.

This Article analyzes whether courts should grant legal personhood to intelligent animal species, such as chimpanzees, with a particular focus on comparisons made to cognitively impaired humans who are recognized as legal persons even though they may have less practical autonomy than intelligent animals. Granting legal personhood would allow human representatives to initiate some legal actions with the animals as direct parties to the litigation, as is presently allowed for humans with cognitive impairments that leave them incapable of representing their own interests. For example, a human asserting to act on behalf of an intelligent animal might seek a writ of habeas corpus to demand release from a restrictive environment where less restrictive environments, such as relatively spacious sanctuaries, are available. Highly publicized litigation seeking legal personhood in a habeas corpus context for chimpanzees is underway in New York, and the lawsuits have garnered the support of some eminent legal scholars and philosophers. Regardless of its short-term success or failure, this litigation represents the beginning of a long struggle with broad and deep societal implications.

A previous article by the author was quoted and largely followed by a unanimous New York appellate court in Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, the most prominent and controversial appellate decision addressing (and rejecting) legal personhood for chimpanzees thus far. This Article builds on that previous article, which focused on justice arguments based on young children with limited practical autonomy being granted legal personhood status. The New York lawsuits and other significant developments have highlighted important additional issues and nuances since the previous article’s publication.

Further, in the previous article the author indicated that additional scholarship was needed addressing justice arguments based on legal personhood being recognized for humans with cognitive impairments not related to typical childhood development – such as humans with significant intellectual disabilities or comatose humans. This Article analyzes these comparisons based on cognitive impairments not related to childhood, as well as analyzing issues presented by the New York lawsuits. The Article concludes that, like comparisons with young children and intelligent animals, comparisons between intelligent animals and humans with cognitive impairments unrelated to childhood do not support restructuring our legal system to make animals persons.

Further, the rights of the most vulnerable humans, particularly humans with severe cognitive impairments, would be endangered over the long term if legal personhood were granted to some animals based on cognitive abilities. Courts should continue to reject animal legal personhood in the lawsuits that will likely continue to be filed in numerous jurisdictions for decades. However, legislatures and courts should embrace societal evolution calling for greater human responsibility regarding our treatment of animals.

Citizens in the State of Massachusetts may be considering a ballot initiative next fall that would severely limit the sale of meat and eggs imported from out of state and would significantly drive up the price of eggs, veal and pork sold in the state, according to Richard Bonanno, president of the Massachusetts Farm Bureau Federation, as reported by Shira Schoenberg at www.masslive.com.

The Citizens for Farm Animal Protection, a coalition of animal rights activists, was formed in the summer of 2015 to collect the required signatures to certify the petition so it could be included on the ballot in 2016. The petition was certified by Mass.’ Attorney General, Petition number 15-11—An Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals.

A summary of the petition is available on the state’s website:

SUMMARY OF NO. 15-11

This proposed law would prohibit any farm owner or operator from knowingly confining any breeding pig, calf raised for veal, or egg-laying hen in a way that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. The proposed law would also prohibit any business owner or operator in Massachusetts from selling whole eggs intended for human consumption or any uncooked cut of veal or pork if the business owner or operator knows or should know that the hen, breeding pig, or veal calf that produced these products was confined in a manner prohibited by the proposed law. The proposed law would exempt sales of food products that combine veal or pork with other products, including soups, sandwiches, pizzas, hotdogs, or similar processed or prepared food items.

The proposed law’s confinement prohibitions would not apply during transportation; state and county fair exhibitions; 4-H programs; slaughter in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; medical research; veterinary exams, testing, treatment and operation if performed under the direct supervision of a licensed veterinarian; five days prior to a pregnant pig’s expected date of giving birth; any day that pig is nursing piglets; and for temporary periods for animal husbandry purposes not to exceed six hours in any twenty-four hour period.

The proposed law would create a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation and would give the Attorney General the exclusive authority to enforce the law, and to issue regulations to implement it. As a defense to enforcement proceedings, the proposed law would allow a business owner or operator to rely in good faith upon a written certification or guarantee of compliance by a supplier.

The proposed law would be in addition to any other animal welfare laws and would not prohibit stricter local laws.

The proposed law would take effect on January 1, 2022.

The ballot initiative process has been used by animal activists for many years to advance their cause.

As Wayne Pacelle notes, the use of the initiative by animal advocates has a long history.

‘If used properly, direct democracy could significantly change the status of animals in many states.’

Between 1990 and 2008, animal advocates squared off against factory farmers, hunters, and other animal industries in 41 statewide ballot campaigns, winning in 28 campaigns and marking a huge surge in the use of the process on animal issues.

74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1109 (Summer 2003).

The AVMA provides a summary of recent ballot initiatives activists have successfully advanced:

Florida saw the first successful challenge in 2002. After lobbying the state legislature unsuccessfully, activists gathered 690,000 signatures to get a proposed amendment to the state constitution on the ballot to prohibit the confinement or tethering of pregnant pigs in such a manner that the pig is prevented from turning around freely.

In 2002, Florida voters approved the amendment. According to the final results, 2,611,011 Floridians or about 55% voted in favor of the amendment and 2,157,047 or 45% voted against it.

Arizona voters followed suit in 2006 by voting in favor of a ballot initiative to ban intensive confinement of gestating pigs and calves raised for veal by 2013. The proposal was approved by 61% of the voters.

In Nov. 2008, California voters approved the ballot initiative Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, also known as Proposition 2, with 63% of the vote. It will prohibit, effective 2015, confinement of farm animals in a manner that does not allow them to turn around freely, lie down, stand up and fully extend their limbs. This is the first time voters were asked to eliminate the practice of confining chickens in battery cages. Because there are few veal producers in California and the largest pork producer in the state voluntarily had planned to eliminate small crates, the law will mostly affect the state’s 20 million egg-laying hens. Statements from supporters of the initiative indicate that similar measures could be headed to other states.

Time will tell whether the Mass. Farm Animal Ballot Initiative will be successful, and if so, what its impact will be on consumers in that state.